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Abstract
This paper is about the semantics of production rule sets, a language
used to model asynchronous digital circuits. Two formal semantics are
developed and proved equivalent: a set-theoretic semantics that improves
upon an earlier effort of ours, and an executable semantics in rewriting logic.
The set-theoretic semantics is especially suited to meta-level proofs about
production rule sets, whereas the executable semantics can be used with
existing tools to establish, automatically, desirable properties of individual
circuits. Experiments involving several small circuits are detailed wherein
the executable semantics and the rewriting logic tool Maude are used
to automatically check two important properties: hazard and deadlock
freedom. In doing so, we derive several useful optimizations that make
automatic checking of these properties more tractable.
1 Introduction
Asynchronous digital circuits have been employed to design low-power, high-
performance microprocessors, e.g., [19], as well as in emerging applications such
as systems-on-chip (SOCs), e.g., [18], soft-error-tolerant systems, e.g., [9], and
nano-electronics, e.g., [20]. The critical property that makes asynchronous cir-
cuits advantageous in these applications is their enormous immunity to both
intrinsic and extrinsic timing variation. The most common failure mechanism
in synchronous circuits, set-up and hold time variation of latches, is simply not
present in many asynchronous circuit families. At present, the major difficulty
in designing asynchronous circuits is that very few commercially supported asyn-
chronous electronic design automation (EDA) tools or standard cell libraries exist,
making design and implementation of asynchronous circuits more challenging
than for synchronous ones.
The present work concerns the language of production rule sets, which was in-
troduced as part of a correct-by-construction synthesis method for asynchronous
digital circuits [15]. According to this methodology, designs are first given in a
high-level hardware description language called Communicating Hardware Pro-
cesses (CHP). The CHP description is synthesized into a semantically equivalent
hierarchical network of gates and digital switches called a production rule set.
From a given production rule set, one can then straightforwardly generate an
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equivalent representation in a variety of circuit technologies, including CMOS
(complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor).
This paper addresses two issues concerning production rule sets. The first is
the fundamental question of what does a production rule set mean? To that end,
we treat production rule sets as a formal language and assign to that language a
semantics.1 One of the most important aspects addressed by our semantics, and
one that will consume a substantial portion of the development, are notions of
circuit failure called hazards.
In addition to the theoretical importance of providing a solid mathematical
foundation to understand production rule sets and the circuits derived from them,
there are numerous practical benefits to having defined a precise formal semantics.
In particular, a formal semantics helps facilitate a common understanding of
what circuits designed using production rule sets are, and it affords newcomers
to the field of asynchronous design an unambiguous framework in which to
understand existing work. Additionally, a formal semantics provides a set of
mathematical tools for proving properties about asynchronous circuits, and lays
the foundation for the development of automated tools to reason about those
circuits.
The second issue that this paper addresses is just this problem: that of
automatically proving properties about production rule sets, much like one might
prove properties about a software program. Specifically, we consider a notion
of deadlock freedom that is appropriate for production rule sets, as well as a
property called hazard freedom. Both of these properties are necessary conditions
for a circuit to be considered correct. As we will demonstrate, another benefit of
having a precise formal semantics is that, when that semantics is given in an
executable way, some analyses, including deadlock and hazard freedom, can be
made completely automatic. Executability is obtained in this paper through a
semantic formalization in rewriting logic [21, 22] which, through the rewriting
logic engine Maude [5], offers various automated and semi-automated analysis
possibilities.
Contributions This paper, which primarily extends [10] but also builds on
our earlier work from [12], makes several new contributions:
• A new set-theoretic semantics for production rule sets is developed, relative
to a timing assumption called delay-insensitivity [16]. The semantics is
an improvement on our earlier work from [12], providing a more familiar
operational style and, we feel, improved clarity. This semantics is referred
to here as SPRS .
• A new rewriting logic semantics is developed that improves on our earlier
workshop paper [10], from which this current paper is derived. It has
1It should be noted for readers familiar with asynchronous circuit design that the semantics
developed captures a particular timing assumption, specifically delay-insensitivity. Section 7
briefly addresses two more sophisticated timing assumptions, namely speed-independence and
quasi-delay-insensitivity.
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the desirable property that it matches almost exactly the set-theoretic
semantics, and is referred to here as RPRS .
• The close relationship between SPRS and RPRS is proved formally through
the development of a strong bisimulation between their induced transition
systems. This establishes their correctness relative to each other, a common
technique from programming language theory.
• The automated analysis results from [10], which demonstrated the feasibility
of proving hazard freedom and deadlock freedom of asynchronous circuits
described as production rule sets, are extended to apply to the new rewriting
logic semantics.
• Our previous work on involving the more complex timing assumptions of
speed-independence and quasi-delay-insensitivity is put into context with
the new work presented here, so as to provide a complete picture of the
current state of our work on the semantics of production rule sets and
suggest where to proceed going forward in future work.
Organization The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
present some preliminaries on rewriting logic and Maude. Section 3 defines
SPRS , a formal set-theoretic semantics of production rule sets for the delay-
insensitive case. Section 4 defines RPRS , a formal executable semantics of
production rule sets in rewriting logic. Section 5 defines and proves a strong
bisimulation relation between transition systems induced by SPRS and RPRS ,
thus establishing the relative correctness of SPRS and RPRS . Section 6 concerns
the use of the Maude tool to check deadlock and hazard freedom automatically.
Section 7 briefly reviews our previous work on two additional timing assumptions,
speed-independence and quasi-delay-insensitivity, rounding out the current state
of our work on the semantics of production rule sets. Section 8 considers some
related work, and Section 9 finishes with concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries on Rewriting Logic and Maude
Rewriting logic [21] is a semantic framework for concurrency that has been
shown to express in a simple and very natural way a wide range of concurrent
systems. In particular, this applies not only to models of concurrent computation
and to distributed algorithms, but also to programming languages, where it has
stimulated the so-called rewriting logic semantics project [22], where semantic
definitions of concurrent programming languages and hardware description
languages (HDLs) are given by means of rewrite theories. As emphasized in
[22] and exploited in detail in the current work, the rewriting logic semantics
of a language is both mathematical and operational. That is, the mathematical
semantics is given by the initial model of the rewrite theory; and the operational
semantics is given by rewriting logic deduction and makes the language definitions
executable and analyzable by model checking in a language like Maude [5]. This
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paper applies this framework to the case of the highly concurrent HDL of
production rule sets, which specify asynchronous circuits. The mathematical
semantics of the rewrite theory characterizing the behavior of production rule sets
is used to prove the semantic equivalence between the rewriting logic semantics
and a set-theoretic semantics; and the operational semantics is systematically
used to show how asynchronous circuits specified this way can be formally
analyzed by model checking.
A rewrite theory is a triple (Σ, E,R), where (Σ, E) is an equational theory
(in this paper we will assume that (Σ, E) is an order-sorted equational theory,
with types, subtypes, and overloading of function symbols); and where R is
a collection of possibly conditional rewrite rules of the form t → t′ if cond .
What (Σ, E) specifies are the states of the concurrent system being modeled,
so that a state is an element of the initial algebra TΣ/E specified by (Σ, E).
The operations in Σ should be understood as distributed state constructors, so
that a state, say, f(t1, . . . , tn) is the parallel composition with f of the smaller
states t1, . . . , tn. The equations E characterize the structural properties of such
states (and also define any auxiliary function on states). For example, f may
be associative and commutative, so that a distributed state built with f can be
thought of as a “soup” of local states. What the rules in R specify are the local
concurrent transitions possible in the given distributed system; that is, a rule
t→ t′ if cond specifies that whenever a fragment of the distributed state is an
instance of the pattern t and satisfies the condition cond , then that fragment
can make an atomic local transition to the corresponding instance of the pattern
t′. Rewriting logic is intrinsically concurrent because it allows many such local
concurrent transitions to take place simultaneously. In fact, what the deduction
rules of rewriting logic [21] do is to specify and characterize all the possible
concurrent transitions of the system so specified, so that concurrent computation
and rewriting logic deduction become identical.
Maude [5] is an executable formal specification language and system directly
based on rewriting logic. In Maude there are two main types of modules: (i)
functional modules, which are equational specifications of the form fmod (Σ, E)
endfm with an initial algebra semantics; and (ii) system modules, which are
rewriting logic specifications of the form mod (Σ, E,R) endfm with an initial
model semantics. Both functional and system modules are required to satisfy
natural executability conditions such as confluence and termination of the
equations E, and coherence of the rules R with respect to the equations (see
[5]), making them suitable for execution by Maude. Maude has user-definable
syntax, plus keywords for specifying types (called sorts), subtypes, equations,
and rewrite rules. This makes Maude specifications essentially self-explanatory :
anybody familiar with the formalism of equations (a high school graduate) and
rewrite rules can easily read the corresponding Maude versions as essentially
typewriter versions of the mathematical textbook-like descriptions. Besides
supporting simulation of specifications with its reduce command for functional
modules and its rewrite command for system modules, Maude also has good
support for model checking analysis. Specifically, failure of invariants can be
uncovered with its breadth first search command; and LTL model checking of
4
properties is provided by its MODEL-CHECKER module [5].
3 Set-theoretic Semantics: SPRS
This section revisits our work in [12], providing a revised set-theoretic semantics
for production rule sets for the delay-insensitive case. We refer generally to the
formalization given in this section as SPRS . Compared to [12], SPRS applies only
to the delay-insensitive case, but gains a more familiar operational formalization
and, as a result of the more limited scope, a treatment which is substantially
clearer and more concise. The term “set-theoretic” is used to distinguish the
semantics presented in this section, which uses just standard notions from
mathematics, such as sets, functions, and relations, from the executable rewriting
logic semantics which follows in Section 4.
The set-theoretic semantics is useful in various ways. It is suitable as a basis
for formal proofs about production rule sets, an extensive example of which
is developed in [12]. A clear formal semantics is also crucial to facilitating
communication between, and a common understanding amongst, practitioners,
as well as for helping newcomers to the field understand essential concepts.
Section 3.1 deals with the syntax of production rule sets. Section 3.2 intro-
duces the semantics informally through a small example. For simplicity, hazards
are omitted from the discussion in that section. Section 3.3 formalizes the seman-
tics in detail, including hazards, and Section 3.4 returns to the example circuit
and works through an execution that generates a hazard. Section 3.5 contains a
discussion about production rule sets in the context of two somewhat similar
formalisms for concurrency, guarded commands and communicating sequential
processes.
3.1 Syntax
The “syntax” of production rule sets consists of a mathematical construct defining
a single production rule, and then a mechanism for gathering together finite
sets of these constructions; hence the name production rule sets. There is also a
stylized way of writing production rule sets that we review below. The choice of
which notation to use is just a matter of convenience.
Definition 1 (Syntax of Production Rule Sets). Let Y denote a denumerable
set of variables used to specify node names. A production rule is a triple (g, x, d),
with g, the guard, being a boolean expression involving variables from Y , x ∈ Y
is the transition variable, and d ∈ {↑, ↓} is the transition direction. A production
rule set is a finite set of production rules.
A production rule (g, x, d) is often written in the following, stylized manner
g 7→ x d
and a set of production rules {(g1, x1, d1), . . . , (gm, xm, dm)} is often written as
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Figure 1: Gate-level and CMOS-level Specification of a 3-Inverter Ring Oscillator.
a newline-separated list of the individual rules
g1 7→ x1d1
...
gm 7→ xmdm
3.2 Example
The purpose of this section is to give, by way of example, an informal introduction
to the dynamic behavior of production rule sets; that is, their semantics. The
example circuit we consider is shown in Figure 1. It is known as a 3-inverter
ring oscillator.
Digital ring oscillators are typically amongst the first circuits designed and
tested in new process technologies, and they can be used as timing elements
and clock generators. The simplest ring-oscillator consists of an odd number of
inverters connected sequentially to form a loop. Since the number of inverters
is odd, the output of each inverter will change value in sequence perpetually;
as such, the ring of inverters is said to oscillate. For electrical reasons, a single
inverter ring does not oscillate, so the simplest ring oscillator contains three
inverters.
Figure 1 depicts a 3-inverter ring oscillator consisting of two simple inverters
and one modified inverter. In order to simplify the presentation of certain
undesired circuit behaviors, we have made it so that the transistors governing
the inverter with output x2 may switch independently.
2 The production rule set
corresponding to the 3-inverter ring oscillator depicted in Figure 1 is
2In modern CMOS technologies (65nm and smaller), transistor parameters vary significantly
from their nominal values due to process-induced variation and random dopant fluctuation.
Considering a large circuit with say billions of transistors, there will exist a few gates, e.g.,
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¬x3 7→ x1 ↑ x1 7→ x1,1 ↑ x1 7→ x1,2 ↑ ¬x1,1 7→ x2 ↑ ¬x2 7→ x3 ↑
x3 7→ x1 ↓ ¬x1 7→ x1,1 ↓ ¬x1 7→ x1,2 ↓ x1,2 7→ x2 ↓ x2 7→ x3 ↓
Let us assume that the oscillator begins in a state where the nodes take
values according to a function σ : {x1, x1,1, x1,2, x2, x3} −→ {0, 1} defined by
x1, x1,1, x1,2, x3 7→ 0
x2 7→ 1
For the moment we will think of the semantics of production rule sets as essentially
specifying all possible σ′s reachable from σ in a single computation step.
Informally, the σ′s reachable from σ are obtained by considering all rules
with a true guard, choosing any subset of them, and then executing the right-hand
sides of the rules in this set. In our example, all of the following rules have
guards that are true
¬x3 7→ x1 ↑ ¬x1,1 7→ x2 ↑
¬x1 7→ x1,1 ↓ ¬x1 7→ x1,2 ↓ x2 7→ x3 ↓
However, note that while all of these production rules have guards that evaluate
to true in the current state, only the rule ¬x3 7→ x1 ↑ can effect an observable
change in the state of the circuit nodes (x1 rises from 0 to 1); this is a notion we
call enablement ; the rule ¬x3 7→ x1 ↑ is said to be enabled, whereas, for example,
the rule x2 7→ x3 ↓ is not enabled.
As there is only a single enabled rule, and because the semantics allows for
selecting no rules during a step, there are only two possible σ′s reachable from
σ; namely σ′ = σ and the σ′ defined by
x1, x2 7→ 1
x1,1, x1,2, x3 7→ 0
From the above σ′, where x1 has switched, there are four σ′′s subsequently
reachable, one for each subset of {x1,1, x1,2}. Both of these nodes are enabled to
switch to 1, and in a single step either node may, independently, “choose” to
switch or not switch.
The semantics as just described omits one major issue that will be handled
in the formal semantics: hazards. The concept of a hazard corresponds to a
circuit failure and will manifest itself by a node in the circuit taking a value X
which is distinct from the usual 0 or 1. We will return to the 3-inverter ring
oscillator in Section 3.4 to expand the example execution steps so that hazards
and their semantics are accounted for.
inverters, with extreme parameter variation where, for example, the PFET is several orders
of magnitude slower than the NFET. It then becomes reasonable to model such a gate with
independently-controlled transistors.
7
3.3 Set-theoretic Semantics
At a high level, our goal is to define a binary relation between program states,
denoted −→P , that corresponds to one step of concurrent execution, relative to
a production rule set P . s −→P s′ means that it is possible to reach state s′
from state s in one computation step. The space of executions is then given by
the infinite −→P -chains
s1 −→P s2 −→P s3 −→P · · ·
subject to a form of fairness described later.
Fix a production rule set P . VariableP ⊆ Y denotes the set of all variables
occurring in P . A state (with respect to P ) is a pair
(σ : VariableP −→ Level , H ⊆ VariableP )
where Level
def
= {0, X, 1}. The set of all states (with respect to P ) is denoted
StateP .
The σ component of a state (σ,H) serves the familiar purpose of specifying
values for all nodes in the circuit, with the X value meaning that a hazard has
been expressed at that node. As indicated in the introduction, the treatment of
certain kinds of circuit failures called hazards is a central feature of our semantics,
and a substantial portion of the development will be dedicated to defining the
semantics of hazards. The second component of a state, set H above, also
pertains hazards.
Hazards come in two varieties, interference and instability hazards. An
interference hazard occurs when a node is simultaneously being pulled both up
and down in the current state, roughly corresponding to a short circuit. For a
given valuation σ : VariableP −→ Level , and we define a set
InterferenceP,σ ⊆ VariableP
such that y ∈ InterferenceP,σ iff there exists g1 7→ y ↑, g2 7→ y ↓∈ P such
that σ(g1) = σ(g2) = 1. Note that the notation just used assumes a natural
extension, used throughout this paper, of the domain of σ from variables to
boolean expressions, such as g1 and g2. The one complication of this is that we
are operating within a three-valued universe, instead of the usual two-valued one
of booleans. Therefore, we will assume that the meaning of the usual boolean
operators (¬,∧,∨) on {0, 1} are extended to {0, X, 1} according to the following
equivalences.
¬X = X X ∧ 0 = 0 X ∧ 1 = X X ∨ 1 = 1 X ∨ 0 = X X ∧ X = X X ∨ X = X.
Instability hazards occur when a gate starts pulling toward a new output
level, but before reaching a stable voltage level, the gate stops pulling. This is a
property of a computation step, (σ,H) −→P (σ′, H ′), and is captured by a set
InstabilityP,σ,σ′ ⊆ VariableP .
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To define this set, we first need an auxiliary notion, introduced informally in the
example given in the previous section, called enablement. Given a valuation σ,
EnabledP,σ ⊆ VariableP is defined so that y ∈ EnabledP,σ if and only if
• σ(y) 6= 0 and there exists a g 7→ y ↓ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1, or
• σ(y) 6= 1 and there exists a g 7→ y ↑ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1.
Given enablement, y ∈ InstabilityP,σ,σ′ iff y ∈ EnabledP,σ, y /∈ EnabledP,σ′ , and
σ(y) = σ′(y).
For convenience, we define a third predicate which captures both of the
above hazards, as well as the propagation of hazards that have been expressed
previously.
HazardP,σ,σ′ ⊆ VariableP
is defined such that y ∈ HazardP,σ,σ′ iff any of the following conditions are met:
• y ∈ InterferenceP,σ′ ;
• y ∈ InstabilityP,σ,σ′ ;
• there exists a g 7→ yd ∈ P such that σ′(g) = X.
A set of actions, namely variable assignments and skip (with respect to P ),
is defined as
ActionP
def
= {skip} ∪ {x := v | x ∈ VariableP , v ∈ Level}
Given a set of actions A ⊆ ActionP and a variable x ∈ VariableP , we denote the
subset of x-actions of A as
A|x def= {y := v ∈ A | y = x}
Definition 2 (Set-theoretic Semantics of Production Rule Sets). Let
P = {r1, . . . , rm}
be a production rule set. The evaluation relation
−→⊆ (P × StateP )×ActionP
is defined inductively according to the following five inference rules, the first four
governing the evaluation of the action of individual rules:
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↓, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 0
·
x ∈ H〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := X
·
〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip
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Then, the relation −→P is defined by the following fifth rule, which combines
the evaluation results of all of the rules r1, . . . , rm, and, additionally, specifies
the updated H set.
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
where, letting A = {a1, . . . , am}, the node valuation function σ is updated to
σ[a1, . . . , am](x) =

1 if A|x = {x := 1}
0 if A|x = {x := 0}
X if A|x = {x := X} or |A|x| > 1
σ(x) if A|x = ∅
and the set H of possible hazards is updated to the set H[σ, a1, . . . , am] such
that for all y ∈ VariableP , y ∈ H[σ, a1, . . . , am] iff
• y ∈ HazardP,σ,σ[a1,...,am], or
• y ∈ H and σ(y) = σ[a1, . . . , am](y).
Note the fact that a pair 〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 can evaluate to skip. skip has no
effect on the state, which means that the semantics supports true concurrency,
wherein a subset of the set P of production rules actually contributes to a state
transition (σ,H) −→P (σ′, H ′).
An execution is a mapping ξ : N −→ StateP such that for all j ∈ N,
ξ(j) −→P ξ(j + 1) and such that for all y ∈ VariableP , it is not the case that
there exists a j ∈ N where for all i > j, y ∈ EnabledP,σi or y ∈ Hi, but y never
switches; that is, σi(y) = σj(y). This condition is the aforementioned fairness
constraint.
3.4 Example with Hazards
Let us return to the example of Section 3.2 and work through a simple set of
execution steps that result in a hazard. The hazard that will be manifested is
an interference hazard at the inverter whose output is x2. We will make crucial
use of the independent control of that gate’s component transistors.
We begin again at the same place we did in Section 3.2, with the obvious
exception that we now account for hazards. So, our initial state s0 = (σ0, H0)
has σ0 defined by
x1, x1,1, x1,2, x3 7→ 0
x2 7→ 1
and H0 = ∅.
Going to s1 = (σ1, H1), we let x1 switch. Therefore, σ1 is given by
x1, x2 7→ 1
x1,1, x1,2, x3 7→ 0
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and H1 = ∅.
The inference rules governing the action of individual rules always allow for
a skip action to be generated and thus s −→P s is always a legal computation
step for any production rule set P and any state s. Informally, this corresponds
to choosing the empty set of rules with true guards. Along such lines, let us say
that s2 = s1.
In going from s2 = s1 to s3 = (σ3, H3), we will create the basic condition
for the hazard to become expressed. Let σ3 be such that x1,2 switches, but x1,1
does not; these are the only two currently enabled rules. That is, σ3 is
x1, x1,2, x2 7→ 1
x1,1, x3 7→ 0
The interesting aspect of this state change is that H3 becomes non-empty. It
is straightforward to check that x2 ∈ HazardP,σ2,σ3 , and therefore that x2 ∈ H3.
Since there are production rules ¬x1,1 7→ x2 ↑, x1,2 7→ x2 ↓ ∈ P , both with
guards that are true in σ3, then x2 is witnessing an interference hazard in s2;
and one can show that H3 = {x2}.
Finally, an X can become expressed in going to s4 = (σ4, H4) with
x1, x1,2 7→ 1
x1,1, x3 7→ 0
x2 7→ X
and H4 = {x3}.
3.5 Concurrency in Production Rule Sets
Although the language of production rule sets shares certain features with
both guarded commands [7] and communicating sequential processes (CSP)
[8], it is nevertheless quite different from both of the above formalisms. In
particular, it is tempting to view production rule sets via similar constructs
from guarded commands or CSP, but this is incorrect. As a simple, somewhat
contrived example, consider the following production rule set, which describes
how, depending on the current value of nodes x and y in the circuit, nodes z and
w could be concurrently pulled up toward logical 1 (↑) or pulled down toward
logical 0 (↓)
x 7→ z ↓
y 7→ w ↓
¬y 7→ w ↑,
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A reasonable candidate translation into the language of guarded commands
would be the statement
do x→ z := 0
[ ] y → w := 0
[ ] ¬y → w := 1,
od
Similarly, one might reasonably attempt to view the above production rule set
as the following CSP parallel command
∗[ x→ z := 0 ] ||
∗[ y → w := 0 ] ||
∗[ ¬y → w := 1 ]
All three formalizations are, in fact, semantically different; most importantly, the
production rule set exhibits both the possibility of only some of the production
rules being fired, as well as a form of “true concurrency” which is different from
the standard one-at-a-time semantics of the guarded command statement, or
the interleaving semantics of CSP’s parallel command operator.
If x = y = z = w = 1, then, for the above production rule set, the following
are all possible next states of z, w according to the production rule set semantics:
z = 1, w = 1;
z = 1, w = 0;
z = 0, w = 1;
z = 0, w = 0.
In a single step of computation, neither the guarded command statement nor the
parallel command can change both z and w to 0 since, according to the usual
operational semantics of these systems, each change in the value of a variable
requires a separate semantic step. The guarded command statement and the
CSP parallel command are even different from each other, since performing an
action requires peeling off different sets of syntactic constructs by the operational
rules.
4 Rewriting Logic Semantics: RPRS
The purpose of this section is to translate the set-theoretic semantics of Section
3 into an executable one using rewriting logic [21], a formalism which has been
shown [22] to be well suited for exactly this task. The particular notation used
is that of the rewriting logic tool Maude [5]. As we will see, the rewriting logic
semantics mimics closely the set-theoretic semantics. The rewriting logic theory
described in this section will be referred to as RPRS .
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Executability, in a variety of useful forms, is obtained as a direct result
of employing the Maude tool, which allows us to simulate circuits as well as
exhaustively check that a circuit satisfies desirable correctness properties, such as
hazard freedom and deadlock freedom, for example. Exploiting the execution and
formal analysis capabilities gained from the Maude specification is the subject
of Section 6 (the entire Maude specification is available at [11]).
The syntax of production rule sets is defined first. Recall that a production
rule is a triple g 7→ x d with g a Boolean expression, x a variable, and d the
transition direction. What is needed in rewriting logic are new sorts corresponding
to these concepts and populated with appropriate terms. Maude’s QID module
[5, §9.2] provides our variables: strings of characters preceded by a single quote.
fmod AUX-SYNTAX is pr QID * (sort Qid to Variable) .
sorts Guard Direction ProductionRule .
subsort Variable < Guard .
op not_ : Guard -> Guard .
op _and_ : Guard Guard -> Guard .
op _or_ : Guard Guard -> Guard .
ops + - : -> Direction .
op [_->__] : Guard Variable Direction -> ProductionRule .
endfm
Compared to the syntax from Section 3, the corresponding terms using Maude
notation are very similar. The production rule ¬y 7→ w ↑ becomes the term
[not ’y -> ’w +] of sort ProductionRule in Maude, for example.
Obtaining an appropriate rewriting logic definition of sets of production rules
is most easily accomplished by instantiating Maude’s parameterized SET module
([5, §9.12.2]) with a view expressing the fact that elements of the set will be terms
of sort ProductionRule. The module given next does exactly that; additionally,
it renames the default sort and union operator to a more convenient syntax. The
details of parameterized programming in Maude (theories, views, etc.) can be
found in [5, §8.3].
view ProductionRule from TRIV to AUX-SYNTAX is
sort Elt to ProductionRule .
endv
fmod SYNTAX is pr SET{ProductionRule} *
( sort Set{ProductionRule} to ProductionRuleSet
, op _,_ to __
) .
endfm
13
Therefore, in the notation of the SYNTAX module, the production rule set
x 7→ z ↓
y 7→ w ↓
¬y 7→ w ↑,
becomes a term of sort ProductionRuleSet, written in Maude as
[ ’x -> ’z -]
[ ’y -> ’w -]
[not ’y -> ’w +]
Continuing from the start of Section 3.3, we define an operator which takes
a production rule set P as an argument and returns the set of Variable terms
corresponding to the set VariableP defined in Section 3.3. Recall that VariableP
was defined to be the set containing all of the variables occurring in P . Variables
can be embedded into the guard g of a rule g 7→ x d, and also include all transition
variables (x in g 7→ x d).
view Variable from TRIV to SYNTAX is
sort Elt to Variable .
endv
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-1 is
pr SET{Variable} * (sort Set{Variable} to 2^Variable) .
--- meta-variable declarations omitted
op Variable-{_} : ProductionRuleSet -> 2^Variable .
eq Variable-{ empty} = empty .
eq Variable-{[G -> Y D] P} =
varsOf(G), Y, Variable-{P} .
op varsOf : Guard -> 2^Variable .
eq varsOf(Y) = Y .
eq varsOf(not G) = varsOf(G) .
eq varsOf(G1 and G2) = varsOf(G1) , varsOf(G2) .
eq varsOf(G1 or G2) = varsOf(G1) , varsOf(G2) .
endfm
Notice that we have omitted the meta-variable declarations used in the
equations of the above module, something we will continue to do in subsequent
modules. Each used variable is given a sort equal to the one declared for the
operator argument in which it is positioned (see [11] for details).
Unlike the set VariableP , which was specified according an equationally
defined function, the sets Level and StateP will be given entirely new sorts.
Recall that Level = {0, X, 1} and that for a production rule set P a state is a
pair (σ,H) with σ : VariableP −→ Level and H ⊆ VariableP . The σ component
is defined using Maude’s MAP module [5, §9.13.1].
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-2 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-1 .
sorts Level .
ops 0 1 X : -> Level .
endfm
view Level from TRIV to AUX-SEMANTICS-2 is
sort Elt to Level .
endv
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-3 is
pr MAP{Variable,Level} * (op _[_] to _(_)) .
sort State .
op (_,_) : Map{Variable,Level} 2^Variable -> State .
endfm
Note that the parameter P of StateP is effectively ignored in our rewriting
logic specification. The implication of this is that, in principle, one could
introduce a state which has or lacks a valuation for any variable, regardless of
whether or not that variable is in a production rule set P under consideration.
This could be be fixed through the use of memberships [5, §4], but the specification
would continue to be unsatisfactory for efficiency and other reasons. Furthermore,
if we begin with a correct state, the rules in the rewriting semantics will never
lead to an inconsistent state; therefore, ignoring the parameter P in StateP is
harmless.
As an example of what AUX-SEMANTICS-3 provides, suppose that we have a
state (σ,H) for the above production rule set where
σ(x) = 0
σ(y) = 0
σ(z) = 1
σ(w) = X
and H = {y, z}; the representation of (σ,H) as a term of sort State is written
in the Maude notation as
((’x |-> 0, ’y |-> 0, ’z |-> 1, ’w |-> X), (’y , ’z))
Moving on to the definition of the various hazard-related concepts, we will
require the ability to evaluate guards according to a three-valued valuation.
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-4 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-3 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op _(_) : Map{Variable,Level} Guard -> Level .
eq Sigma(not G1) = not3 Sigma(G1) .
eq Sigma(G1 and G2) = Sigma(G1) and3 Sigma(G2) .
eq Sigma(G1 or G2) = Sigma(G1) or3 Sigma(G2) .
op not3_ : Level -> Level [prec 24] .
eq not3 0 = 1 .
eq not3 1 = 0 .
eq not3 X = X .
op _and3_ : Level Level -> Level [assoc comm id: 1] .
eq X and3 0 = 0 .
eq 0 and3 0 = 0 .
eq X and3 X = X .
op _or3_ : Level Level -> Level [assoc comm id: 0] .
eq X or3 1 = 1 .
eq 1 or3 1 = 1 .
eq X or3 X = X .
endfm
We are now in a position to handle the primary definitions having to
do with hazards: InterferenceP,σ, InstabilityP,σ,σ′ , and HazardP,σ,σ′ ; all of
which are predicates on VariableP . Consider InterferenceP,σ. We declare
an equationally defined function that takes two arguments, one a term of
sort ProductionRuleSet corresponding to P , and the second a term of sort
Map{Variable,Level} corresponding to σ, and returns a term of sort 2^Variable
corresponding to InterferenceP,σ.
Recall how InterferenceP,σ ⊆ VariableP was defined: for all y ∈ VariableP ,
y ∈ InterferenceP,σ if and only if there exists g1 7→ y ↑, g2 7→ y ↓∈ P such
that σ(g1) = σ(g2) = 1. We accomplish this in Maude with two auxiliary
functions. InterfPred determines if a variable satisfies the interference property
and InterfFilter filters the set VariableP by applying InterfPred to every
variable in P one-by-one.
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-5 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-4 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op InterfPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma) = true
if [G+ -> Y +] [G- -> Y -] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G+) == 1 and Sigma(G-) == 1 .
eq InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma) = false [owise] .
op Interference-{_,_} :
ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level} -> 2^Variable .
eq Interference-{P,Sigma} =
InterfFilter(Variable-{P}, P, Sigma) .
op InterfFilter :
2^Variable ProductionRuleSet
Map{Variable,Level} -> 2^Variable .
eq InterfFilter(empty , P, Sigma) = empty .
eq InterfFilter((Y,YS), P, Sigma) =
if InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma) then Y else empty fi ,
InterfFilter(YS, P, Sigma) .
endfm
InstabilityP,σ,σ′ ⊆ VariableP was defined in Section 3 so that for all y ∈
VariableP , y ∈ InstabilityP,σ,σ′ if and only if y ∈ EnabledP,σ, y /∈ EnabledP,σ′ ,
and σ(y) = σ(y′). Recall that EnabledP,σ ⊆ VariableP was defined so that for
all y ∈ VariableP , y ∈ EnabledP,σ if and only if:
• σ(y) 6= 0 and there exists a g 7→ y ↓ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1, or
• σ(y) 6= 1 and there exists a g 7→ y ↑ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1.
The corresponding definitions in Maude are very similar, and use again the
Pred and Filter pair idea from the definition of Interference. InstFilter
is omitted because it is not substantively different from InterfPred (see [11]).
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-6 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-5 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op EnabledPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 1
/\ [G+ -> Y +] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G+) == 1 .
ceq EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 0
/\ [G- -> Y -] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G-) == 1 .
eq EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma) = false [owise] .
op InstPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq InstPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma )
/\ not EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma’)
/\ Sigma(Y) == Sigma’(Y) .
eq InstPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = false [owise] .
op Instability-{_,_,_} :
ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> 2^Variable .
eq Instability {P, Sigma, Sigma’} =
InstFilter(Variable-{P}, P, Sigma, Sigma’) .
... InstFilter omitted
endfm
HazardP,σ,σ′ is transcribed directly. Recall that HazardP,σ,σ′ is just the union
of InterferenceP,σ′ and InstabilityP,σ,σ′ , plus the propagation of any X values.
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-7 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-6 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op HazardPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma’) .
ceq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if InstPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) .
ceq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if [G -> Y D] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G) == X .
eq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = false [owise] .
op Hazard-{_,_,_} :
ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> 2^Variable .
eq Hazard-{P, Sigma, Sigma’} =
HazardFilter(Variable-{P}, P, Sigma, Sigma’) .
... HazardFilter omitted
endfm
Subsequent to HazardP,σ,σ′ we defined ActionP and A|y, where A ⊆ ActionP
and y ∈ VariableP . Recall that actions are either pairs containing a variable
and a level, or the special action skip. The restriction operator on a set of
actions picks those non-skip actions with a particular variable given as the first
component.
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-8 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-7 .
sort Action .
op _:=_ : Variable Level -> Action .
op skip : -> Action .
endfm
view Action from TRIV to AUX-SEMANTICS-8 is
sort Elt to Action .
endv
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-9 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-8 .
pr SET{Action} * (sort Set{Action} to 2^Action) .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op _|_ : 2^Action Variable -> 2^Action .
eq (Y := V , A) | Y = Y := V , (A | Y) .
eq A | Y = empty [owise] .
endfm
The following rewrite rules are used to mimic the effect of the four inference
rules
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↓, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 0
·
x ∈ H〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := X
·
〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip
mod AUX-SEMANTICS-10 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-9 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op <_,_> : ProductionRule State -> [Action] .
crl < [G -> Y +], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 1)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
crl < [G -> Y -], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 0)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
crl < [G -> Y D], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := X)
if Y in H .
rl < [G -> Y D], (Sigma,H) > => skip .
endm
Notice that the <_,_> constructor yields a term of kind [Action] (see [5,
§3.5]), but without a proper sort. This will be crucial when we define the rewrite
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rule corresponding to −→P to ensure that all of the 〈rj , (σ,H)〉 get rewritten
according to the above rules into actions aj ; that is, terms of sort Action.
The top-level rewrite rule that ultimately gives us −→P relies on rewrit-
ing logic equivalents for σ[a1, . . . , am] and H[σ, a1, . . . , am]. We start with
σ[a1, . . . , am], which was defined in Section 3 according to
σ[a1, . . . , am](x) =

1 if A|x = {x := 1}
0 if A|x = {x := 0}
X if A|x = {x := X} or |A|x| > 1
σ(x) if A|x = ∅
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-11 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-9 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op _[_] :
Map{Variable,Level} 2^Action -> Map{Variable,Level} .
eq empty [A] = empty .
eq (Y |-> V , Sigma) [A] = sigma’(Y, V, A) , (Sigma[A]) .
op sigma’ : Variable Level 2^Action -> Entry{Variable,Level} .
ceq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> 1
if (Y := 1) == A | Y .
ceq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> 0
if (Y := 0) == A | Y .
ceq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> X
if (Y := X) == (A | Y) or | (A | Y) | > 1 .
eq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> V [owise] .
endfm
H[σ, a1, . . . , am] is similarly straightforward. Following the definition from
Section 3, H[σ, a1, . . . , am] ⊆ VariableP such that for all y ∈ VariableP , y ∈
H[σ, a1, . . . , am] iff
• y ∈ HazardP,σ,σ[a1,...,am], or
• y ∈ H and σ(y) = σ[a1, . . . , am](y).
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-12 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-11 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op HPred : Variable ProductionRuleSet State 2^Action -> Bool .
ceq HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) = true
if HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma[A]) .
ceq HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) = true
if Y in H
/\ Sigma(Y) == (Sigma[A])(Y) .
eq HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) = false [owise] .
op _[_,_]‘{_} :
2^Variable Map{Variable,Level} 2^Action
ProductionRuleSet -> 2^Variable .
eq H [Sigma, A] {P} = HFilter(Variable-{P}, P, (Sigma,H), A) .
op HFilter :
2^Variable ProductionRuleSet State
2^Action -> 2^Variable .
eq HFilter(empty , P, (Sigma,H), A) = empty .
eq HFilter((Y,YS), P, (Sigma,H), A) =
if HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) then Y else empty fi ,
HFilter(YS, P, (Sigma,H), A) .
endfm
Finally, we give a conditional rewrite rule that captures the earlier top-level
inference rule
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
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mod SEMANTICS is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-12 .
pr AUX-SEMANTICS-10 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
vars A : 2^Action .
sort Configuration .
op _{_} : State ProductionRuleSet -> Configuration .
op mkActs : ProductionRuleSet State -> [2^Action] .
eq mkActs(empty, (Sigma,H)) = empty .
eq mkActs(R P , (Sigma,H)) =
< R, (Sigma,H) > , mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) .
crl (Sigma,H) {P} => (Sigma[A],H[Sigma,A] {P}) {P}
if mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A .
endm
There are a couple of ways in which the rewriting logic definition appears
different from the corresponding inference rule. First, note that since we are
using the logical symbol −→ (from rewriting logic) to define −→P (from our
static semantics), the production rule set parameter must be encoded in the
terms being rewritten. This is the purpose of the _{_} constructor.
The second difference is that the single condition of the rewrite rule above
mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A
serves the purpose of the multiple premises of the inference rule
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
The reason for this difference is that the number of premises, m, is not fixed, but
rather scales dynamically with the size of the production rule set; in rewriting
logic, however, the number of conditions in a rewrite rule is fixed.
Finally, it is important to note that while mkActs is only kinded, the variable
A has sort 2^Action. This ensures that all of the individual production rules
are rewritten to actions in the condition, before a computation step is taken.
5 Strong Bisimulation between SPRS and RPRS
This section establishes a strong bisimulation between two transition systems:
one induced by the set-theoretic semantics of production rule sets, SPRS , and the
other induced by the executable semantics given in rewriting logic, RPRS . In so
doing, confidence is raised in the correctness of the two semantic formalizations,
as well as in the use of the executable semantics as an analysis tool. This
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increased confidence applies in particular to the model checking results presented
later in Section 6.
The strong bisimulation result is obtained as follows. First, we define a
function, castP , that maps states in the set-theoretic semantics to corresponding
states in the rewriting logic semantics. We then make explicit the transition
systems associated to both the semantics; and finally we show that the two
are strongly bisimilar via castP . This result yields as corollaries that hazard
freedom and deadlock freedom, which are also defined formally later in this
section, are preserved by the mapping between the two semantics.
We introduce a number of mathematical conventions that are used throughout
this section. First, we assume that RPRS is comprised as
RPRS = (ΣPRS , EPRS , RPRS) .
Use of the sort name Configuration is overloaded to also denote the set
TΣPRS/EPRS ,Configuration
of elements of TΣPRS/EPRS of sort Configuration; the distinction will be clear
from context.
5.1 castP
Fix a production rule set P . Our bisimulation relation is defined by a function
castP taking each state (σ,H) ∈ StateP to a corresponding term in the rewriting
logic specification RPRS ; specifically, castP ((σ,H)) will be a term of sort
Configuration. That is, applying the overloading of Configuration specified
above, castP is a function
castP : StateP −→ Configuration.
castP is defined by means of two auxiliary cast functions, one that recurses
over the structure of an element of StateP , yielding a term of sort State, and a
second recursing over the structure of a production rule set and yielding a term
of sort ProductionRuleSet; specifically,
castP (s) = (cast(s)){cast(P )}.
To simplify the presentation note that we have used “cast” in an ad-hoc
polymorphic way to denote both the function that converts the state part, as
well as the function that converts the production rule set. cast will also name all
similar functions converting other types of objects in the set-theoretic semantics
into terms in the rewriting logic semantics.
The definition of cast functions is largely routine. For most constructs in
the set-theoretic formalization, there is a corresponding operator in the rewriting
logic semantics with the same arguments and we simply generate that operator
and then recurse. For example, individual production rules are cast as
cast(g 7→ x d) = [cast(g) -> cast(x) cast(d)]
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At the bottom are the atomic elements of the syntax, such as variables and the
transition directions, which are cast as
cast(↑) = + cast(↓) = -
Casting finite sets made out of simpler elements highlights an interesting
point. The following definition is unambiguous and correct in rewriting logic, as
well as in Maude, by asserting that the operator __, juxtaposition, is associative,
commutative, and idempotent. Specifically in Maude, its predefined SET module
[5, §9.12.2] employs equational attributes [5, §4.4.1] and associate-commutative
rewriting for associativity and commutativity, and for idempotency an explicit
equation is used.
cast({r1, . . . , rm}) = cast(r1) · · · cast(rm)
Similarly, valuation functions of the form σ : VariableP −→ Level can be
viewed as sets of pairs, and are cast accordingly into
cast({(y1, v1), . . . , (ym, vm)}) =
cast(y1) |-> cast(v1) , . . . , cast(ym) |-> cast(vm)
By way of summarizing, consider the production rule set corresponding to a
single nand-gate
P = {x1 ∧ x2 7→ y ↓,¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 7→ y ↑}
and a state s = (σ, ∅) where σ(x1) = σ(x2) = σ(y) = 1. Then castP (s) yields
the following term
(’x1 |-> 1 , ’x2 |-> 1, ’y |-> 1, empty)
{ [ ’x1 and ’x2 -> ’y - ]
[ (not ’x1) or (not ’x2) -> ’y + ] }
The following lemma will be useful to simplify some of the proofs given later.
Lemma 1. Let P be a production rule set.
castP : StateP −→ Configuration
is injective.
Proof. Straightforward by induction on StateP .
5.2 Strong Bisimulation
Having defined castP we are now in a position to state our main result es-
tablishing the strong bisimulation between SPRS and RPRS . For notational
convenience and symmetry, for a given production rule set P , clear from context,
we use −→M to denote the relation −→P defined according to the set-theoretic
semantics SPRS . Similarly, we use −→R to denote the one step rewriting relation
induced by RPRS on terms of sort Configuration.
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Theorem 1. Let P be a production rule set. Consider the transition systems
TM
def
= (StateP ,−→M)
TR
def
= (Configuration,−→R)
castP , when seen as a relation, is a strong bisimulation between TM and TR.
The following lemma will be useful in the proof of the above theorem.
Lemma 2. Let P be a production rule set. For all g 7→ x d ∈ P , (σ,H) ∈ StateP ,
and a ∈ ActionP , we have
〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ a
according to SPRS , if and only if
RPRS ` cast(〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(a)
Proof.
See A.
Having this lemma, we can proceed with a proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1.
See A.
The two correctness properties that we are concerned with, hazard freedom
and deadlock freedom, can both be phrased in terms of simple reachability
queries. For a transition system A = (A,−→⊆ A× A) and an element a ∈ A,
we let ReachA(a) ⊆ A denote the set of reachable states from a; i.e.,
{a′ ∈ A | a −→∗ a′}.
The relative correctness of SPRS and RPRS with respect to these correctness
properties will fall out through instances of the following corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Let P be a production rule set and s0 ∈ StateP . For any pair of
predicates
QM ⊆ StateP and QR ⊆ Configuration
such that s ∈ QM if and only if castP (s) ∈ QR, then
ReachTM(s0) ⊆ QM if and only if ReachTR(castP (s0)) ⊆ QR.
Proof of Corollary 1.
See A.
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5.3 Hazard Freedom
Hazard freedom essentially asserts the impossibility of reaching a state where any
node takes the value X. Let P be a production rule set. We define a predicate
Hazard !P ⊆ StateP such that for all (σ,H) ∈ StateP , (σ,H) ∈ Hazard !P if and
only if there exists a y ∈ VariableP with σ(y) = X.
Definition 3. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level . We
say that SPRS exhibits hazard freedom with respect to P and σ if and only if for
all
(σ′, H ′) ∈ ReachTM((σ, ∅))
(σ′, H ′) /∈ Hazard !P .
In rewriting logic, we can give an equationally-defined function, Hazard!,
which is essentially the characteristic function of Hazard !P .
op Hazard! : Configuration -> Bool [frozen] .
eq Hazard!(((Y |-> X, SIGMA), H){P}) = true .
eq Hazard!((SIGMA, H){P}) = false [owise] .
Definition 4. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level . We
say that RPRS exhibits hazard freedom with respect to P and σ if and only if for
all
c′ ∈ ReachTR(castP ((σ, ∅)))
such that we have Hazard!(c′) = false.
Proposition 1. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level .
RPRS exhibits hazard freedom with respect to P and σ if and only if SPRS
exhibits hazard freedom with respect to P and σ.
Proof. According to Corollary 1, it is sufficient to show that for all s /∈ StateP ,
s ∈ Hazard !P if and only if Hazard!(castP (s)) = false. This is straightforward
by induction on states.
5.4 Deadlock Freedom
As with hazard freedom, deadlock freedom will be characterized with respect
to a production rule set and an initial valuation. It is essentially an assertion
of the impossibility of reaching a state where no rules are enabled. One small
difference from the definition of enablement is needed to account for X values,
however. Equivalently, it asserts the impossibility of reaching a state where the
only transitions that are possible are idle transitions.
Let P be a production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level and recall from
Section 3.3 the definition of EnabledP,σ ⊆ VariableP . For all y ∈ VariableP ,
y ∈ EnabledP,σ if and only if
• σ(y) 6= 0 and there exists a g 7→ y ↓ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1, or
• σ(y) 6= 1 and there exists a g 7→ y ↑ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1.
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We define a new predicate, SwitchableP,σ,H ⊆ VariableP , similar to EnabledP,σ,
but also with a parameter H ⊆ VariableP . For a variable y ∈ VariableP and a
state (σ,H) ∈ StateP , y ∈ SwitchableP,σ,H if and only if either y ∈ EnabledP,σ
or y 6= X and y ∈ H.
The definition of deadlock freedom is then analogous to the definition of
hazard freedom, with SwitchableP,σ,H 6= ∅ serving the purpose of σ /∈ Hazard !P .
Definition 5. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level . We
say that SPRS exhibits deadlock freedom with respect to P and σ if and only if
for all
(σ′, H ′) ∈ ReachTM((σ, ∅))
SwitchableP,σ′,H′ 6= ∅.
Above in Section 4 we defined the rewriting logic equivalent to the conditions
that define whether a particular variable is in the set of things that are enabled.
This was denoted EnabledPred. We define a similar notion for SwitchableP,σ,H ,
called SwitchPred.
op SwitchPred : Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
2^Variable -> Bool .
ceq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 1
/\ [G+ -> Y +] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G+) == 1 .
ceq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 0
/\ [G- -> Y -] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G-) == 1 .
ceq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= X
/\ Y in H .
eq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = false [owise] .
To get Switchable from SwitchPred, we simply need a function that gets
all of the variables from a production rule set and then filters the result by
SwitchPred. This is entirely routine, and can be had in exactly the same way
as we defined for, for example, InterfFilter.
Definition 6. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level . We
say that P exhibits deadlock freedom with respect to P and σ if and only if for all
(SIGMA’,H’){P} ∈ ReachTR(castP ((σ, ∅)))
Switchable-{P,SIGMA’,H’} 6= empty.
Proposition 2. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level .
RPRS exhibits deadlock freedom with respect to P and σ if and only if SPRS
exhibits deadlock freedom with respect to P and σ.
Proof. Similar to that for preservation of hazard freedom.
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6 Hazard and Deadlock Freedom Analysis with
RPRS and Maude
This section investigates the feasibility of using our executable semantics and the
formal tools provided by Maude to prove hazard freedom and deadlock freedom,
two properties that every asynchronous circuit must typically satisfy in order to
be considered correct. All of the Maude source code and example circuits used
for experimentation are open source and available at [11].
Section 6.1 briefly describes each of the asynchronous circuits we are sub-
jecting to analysis. Section 6.2 describes the commands necessary to check
hazard and deadlock freedom using Maude and the semantics RPRS presented in
Section 4. These results demonstrate the need for some optimizations, which are
described in Section 6.3, followed in Section 6.4 by modified analysis results with
the optimizations enabled. Due to the highly asynchronous nature of production
rule sets, there is an enormous state space explosion even for simple circuits;
therefore, the optimizations we present are essential to model check circuits in
practice.
6.1 Circuits Analyzed
Our experiments cover six circuits of size varying from 12 production rules up
to 130 production rules. The complete production rule set for each circuit can
be found in [11].
• 3InverterRing (12 production rules): A ring oscillator is typically the
first circuit used to demonstrate the viability of a new process technology.
• ClosedBuffer (26 production rules): Simple logical buffer stages are gen-
erally used to balance parallel paths in an asynchronous pipeline. Closing
the buffer requires a source to produce tokens to send into the buffer and
a sink to empty the buffer.
• Toggle (28 production rules): A circuit that alternates between sourcing
a one or a zero token are essential components of most test harnesses.
• PCHBAndFixed (66 production rules): The PCHB (pre-charged half buffer)
is a customized quasi delay-insensitive gate that is electrically similar to
a stage of domino logic. A PCHB can be used in a data-path to perform
computation, it can be used for control, or it can act as a combination
thereof. In this instance the input to the PCHB is a fixed value.
• 1BitFullAdderFixed (118 production rules): The bit-slice ripple-carry
adder is ubiquitous in digital VLSI design. This variant is implemented as
a quasi delay-insensitive PCHB with the input of the adder tied to a fixed
value source.
29
• PCHBAndToggle (130 production rules): This instance of a PCHB AND-
gate makes use of the toggle element to alternate the input pattern thus
generating each possible input permutation.
6.2 Model Checking Experiments
The hazard and deadlock freedom analyses are performed using Maude’s search
command [5, §12]. search does a breadth-first search enumerating all terms
reachable from a given initial term through rewriting. If this set of reachable
terms is finite and one is interested in checking computable invariants, as is
the case for both hazard and deadlock freedom, then search acts as a decision
procedure for the satisfaction of the given invariant.
As described above in Section 5.3, the invariant we want to check for hazard
freedom is the negation of Hazard!, or alternatively, that no reachable state
satisfies Hazard!. We use this second formulation, which is accomplished in
Maude by executing the following command,
search [1] initialC =>* C:Configuration such that Hazard!(C) .
The term initialC equals castP ((σ, ∅)) where σ denotes the valuation of
nodes of the device at reset. If no solution is returned, then the device is
considered hazard-free with respect to that reset state. If not, then the device
has a potential hazard.
The situation for deadlock freedom is analogous, except that the invariant for
deadlock freedom is that Switchable-{_,_,_} should never be empty; again,
we use the dual formalization, however. The appropriate incantation is3
search [1] initialC =>* (SIGMA’,H’){P} such that
Switchable-{P,SIGMA’,H’} == empty .
Applying these checks to each of the circuits described above in Section
6.1 we find that none of the checks are able to finish due to exhausting the
system’s available memory resources, which are substantial for a contemporary
system (24GiB). For consistency with the presentation of subsequent results,
this initial experiment is reported in Figure 2. Clearly, some form of simplifica-
tion/optimization is needed to reduce memory consumption and gain tractability
even for the very small circuits we are considering.
6.3 Performance Optimizations
Two optimizations to the rewriting logic semantics, RPRS , are now developed.
These are specifically aimed at addressing excessive memory consumption and
result in tractable analysis of all but our largest circuit, PCHBAndToggle. In the
case of the largest circuit, the analysis is still improved in the sense that, with
respect to the system configuration limits that we set, it goes from being memory
bound to being computation bound (Of course, it is possible that relaxing the
3The reason why the search command cannot use the =>! modality is because empty sets
of actions can always produce idle transitions.
30
Circuit Name Size Hazard Freedom Deadlock Freedom
3InverterRing 12rl MEM MEM
ClosedBuffer 26rl MEM MEM
Toggle 28rl MEM MEM
PCHBAndFixed 66rl MEM MEM
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl MEM MEM
PCHBAndToggle 130rl MEM MEM
Figure 2: Hazard freedom and deadlock freedom model checking results, without
optimizations. System configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz,
8MiB L3), 24GiB RAM, 64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “TIME” means
the experiment timed out (30 minutes), and “MEM” means it reached a preset
memory limit (4GiB).
time-limit constraint, say to an hour, might once again cause us to encounter a
memory limitation; however, having observed system behavior as the experiment
was run, this appears to be unlikely: the memory footprint was not growing very
slowly when the time limit was reached.)
Out-of-control memory usage is primarily due to the condition of the top-level
rewrite rule in RPRS , which, recalling from Section 4, is
mkActs(P, (Sigma,I)) => A.
Suppose that we have the production rule set
[ ’x -> ’z -]
[ ’y -> ’w -]
[not ’y -> ’w +]
Applying mkActs to this set yields the following term of kind [2^Action]
< [ ’x -> ’z -], (Sigma,I) > ,
< [ ’y -> ’w -], (Sigma,I) > ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
and each of the elements of this set are rewritten one-by-one until a term of sort
2^Action is obtained, e.g., say
’z := 0 ,
skip ,
’w := X
In deriving this term, Maude is necessarily inefficient, because it cannot know
that the rewriting of each element of the set is independent from the others; that
is, outside of the rule chosen to rewrite each element, the order in which these
rewrites are applied is inconsequential, so rewriting
< [ ’x -> ’z -], (Sigma,I) > ,
skip ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
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and then
’z := 0 ,
skip ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
does not need to be considered separately from first rewriting
’z := 0 ,
< [ ’y -> ’w -], (Sigma,I) > ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
followed by
’z := 0 ,
skip ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
Maude must, however, attempt all 2k possible orderings, where k is the number
of production rules, for what is really just a single possible next state.
The independent nature of the rewriting steps can be communicated to
Maude by, instead of producing a set of terms to rewrite, having mkActs produce
a list with some arbitrary order and then using matching to force the rewriting
to iterate over this list.
The second optimization reduces the possible sets of actions that, at the
condition of the top-most rewrite rule in RPRS , become bound to the variable
A. Accomplishing this reduction is done through a small modification to the
inference rules for −→ in Definition 2, so that, for example,
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
is modified so that the side condition includes also that σ(x) 6= 1; that is σ(g) = 1
becomes σ(g) = 1 and σ(x) 6= 1. Of course, this change must get reflected at
the rewriting logic level as well. The correctness of this optimization, while not
proved in detail, follows from the invariance of the updates to σ and H during a
transition when, for example, σ(x) = 1 and one of the updating actions is x := 1.
6.4 Model Checking Experiments Redux
The result of applying each optimization in isolation, as well as the aggregate
effect of applying both in tandem, is shown in Figure 3 for hazard freedom,
and in Figure 4 for deadlock freedom. With these optimizations, some of our
example circuits can be checked quite quickly. Scalability clearly remains an issue,
however, even after applying the above optimizations, though they accomplish
much over the original semantics, which was, above all, designed for conceptual
clarity.
Therefore, more optimizations along the lines of those above, as well as clever
new ideas will be needed in the future to make automatic checks for hazards
and deadlock reliably tractable for modern circuits. Some additional tractability
can be gained by looking at more practical timing assumptions, described in the
next section, which further reduce the amount of concurrency.
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Circuit Name Size list opt switch opt all opts
3InverterRing 12rl
no
– states – 682ms
– 1, 561, 117
rewrites
no
– states –
296, 363ms
– 174, 533, 736
rewrites
no
N/A states – 5ms
– 13, 709 rewrites
ClosedBuffer 26rl MEM MEM
no
N/A states –
1, 648ms
– 4, 343, 371
rewrites
Toggle 28rl
no
– states –
356, 559ms
– 802, 141, 445
rewrites
MEM
no
N/A states –
454ms
– 1, 224, 675
rewrites
PCHBAndFixed 66rl TIME MEM
no
N/A states –
638, 570ms
– 1, 552, 737, 662
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl TIME MEM TIME
PCHBAndToggle 130rl TIME MEM TIME
Figure 3: Hazard freedom model checking results, with optimizations. System
configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB RAM,
64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “TIME” means the experiment timed out
(30 minutes), and “MEM” means it reached a preset memory limit (4GiB).
7 Speed-Independent and Quasi-Delay-Insensitive
Circuits
The primary objective of this paper is to improve upon our work in [12, 10] for
the unrestricted, or delay-insensitive, case, developing a clearer set-theoretic
semantics, an executable rewriting logic semantics that is almost identical, and
showing that the updated executable semantics is still capable of being used
for automated formal analysis. However, two other timing assumptions, speed-
independence [25, 23] and quasi-delay-insensitivity [15, 18], that we have worked
on previously bear mention as well, so as to complete the picture of where our
current efforts regarding the formal semantics and analysis of production rule
sets and to understand how we intend go proceed in future work.
Toward that end, this section briefly presents analysis results on the same
set of circuits used above, but under the speed-independence and quasi-delay-
insensitive timing assumptions. The results given are with respect to an imple-
mentation of these timing assumptions in Maude [10]. That implementation
was developed in accordance with [12], which provides a detailed account of our
earlier effort to formalize these two timing assumptions in a non-executable way.
In future work, as we mention in Section 9, it will be important to give similar
treatment to these more complex timing assumptions as we have done in the
previous sections of this paper for the delay-insensitive case, iterating on the
non-executable semantics in order to make them clearer, and formally connecting
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Circuit Name Size list opt switch opt all opts
3InverterRing 12rl TIME MEM
no
N/A states –
1, 315, 793ms
– 2, 517, 712, 268
rewrites
ClosedBuffer 26rl MEM MEM TIME
Toggle 28rl TIME MEM
no
N/A states –
73, 891ms
– 177, 563, 797
rewrites
PCHBAndFixed 66rl TIME MEM
no
N/A states –
794, 175ms
– 1, 886, 088, 552
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl TIME MEM TIME
PCHBAndToggle 130rl TIME MEM TIME
Figure 4: Deadlock freedom model checking results, with optimizations. System
configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB RAM,
64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “TIME” means the experiment timed out
(30 minutes), and “MEM” means it reached a preset memory limit (4GiB).
the non-executable semantics with a revised executable semantics in rewriting
logic. However, this is a very substantial undertaking, likely requiring the length
of the current work for each timing assumption individually to specify both a
non-executable and executable semantics and prove their equivalence through a
suitable bisimulation; this is outside the scope of the current paper.
At a high level, both speed-independence and quasi-delay-insensitivity rep-
resent restrictions on relative delay of signals on forks, which occur when the
output of a gate fans out to the input of two or more subsequent gates. Speed-
independence imposes the restriction that if one branch of a fork switches to a
new level, then all branches must switch simultaneously. On the other hand,
quasi-delay-insensitivity allows for some branches of a fork to have stabilized
before others do, but only until a sequence of “acknowledgments” from the
stabilized branch courses through the circuit to the input of the gate connected
to the non-stabilized branch of the original fork. Formal details of these timing
assumptions, given as a non-executable semantics, can be found in [12] and
spend great time defining precisely, for example, a notion of acknowledgment.
Additional details are too extensive to go into additional detail here, but can be
found in the above reference (see also [20]).
The behaviors admitted by delay-insensitivity, quasi-delay-insensitivity, and
speed-independence are related as follows: delay-insensitivity admits strictly
more behaviors than quasi-delay-insensitivity, which in turn admits strictly
more behaviors than speed-independence. Both of the more restrictive timing
assumptions reduce the set of possible device behaviors, thereby making formal
analysis easier. The trade-off is that one must analyze the circuit separately
to ensure that the assumptions made about timing are actually valid given the
physics of the device.
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In addition, the more restrictive timing assumptions have the added, although
somewhat counter intuitive, advantage of being theoretically more capable, in
the sense that the delay-insensitive timing assumption is so permissive that the
set of useful production rule sets becomes limited because more of them imply
hazardous circuit behaviors. A proof of this fact is developed in [14]. It is also
worth noting that, for hazard freedom, we have shown previously that speed-
independence and quasi-delay-insensitivity are equivalent, yielding a simpler
check for the property relative to the quasi-delay-insensitivity assumption. The
proof of this fact is developed in [12].
Figures 5 and 6 present the results of analyzing the circuits from Section 6.1
under the more restrictive timing assumptions. Despite the fact that the number
of behaviors is reduced, we found ourselves still unable to exhaustively prove
hazard freedom and deadlock freedom for our largest circuit, PCHBAndToggle.
Finally, we experimented with an optimization specifically tailored for the
speed-independence case, where we simply removed production rules correspond-
ing to wires. With this optimization we were able to check hazard freedom for
all of the example circuits listed above, as shown in Figure 7. Due to the result
from [12] cited above, this implies hazard freedom in the quasi-delay-insensitive
case as well.
8 Related Work
The work presented in this paper covers two somewhat separate topics and
therefore the related work falls into two distinct categories: the semantics of
production rule sets, as a topic of interest in its own right, and the formal
verification of asynchronous digital circuits, specifically hazard freedom.
Regarding the first topic, namely, the semantics of production rule sets, the
current work improves upon our own earlier efforts in [12, 10]. The current
efforts, including both the set-theoretic and the rewriting logic styles, provide
a cleaner and simpler presentation of the delay-insensitive case. To the best
of our knowledge, no other works have presented semantic issues as an end in
and of themselves, but rather simply in support of some larger goal, such as
Martin’s synthesis method [15, 17]. The semantics has also been addressed in an
auxiliary way to prove that the scope of possible circuits under delay-insensitivity
is limited [16] and that quasi delay-insensitive circuits are Turing-complete [14].
The semantics from [15, 17] was also examined in [26] in order to clarify the
relationship between production rule sets and corresponding physical circuit
implementations.
The second topic addressed is formal verification of asynchronous circuits,
in particular verifying hazard freedom and deadlock freedom. Our work seems
to be the first that attempts to use the formal executable semantics approach
(modulo our work in [10], on which the current work is based). It is also the only
work that we know of that provides an extensive formal verification platform
for asynchronous circuits designed using production rule sets, which we get via
Maude’s built in tools, including a full LTL model checker.
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The methods developed in [3] use two versions of the circuit; one high-level
and one low-level. Both designs are given as specialized automata, and while a
full enumeration of the reachable state space in the high-level design is necessary,
a careful analysis shows how to avoid doing the same for the low-level design.
This yields a more efficient analysis of hazard free operation, since the high-level
design has a smaller state space than the more detailed, low-level design. [28]
uses the modern program analysis technique of abstract interpretation to reason
about hazards in asynchronous circuits. [29] uses a standard symbolic model
checker to verify hazard free operation of speed-independent circuits, and an
older tool called prlint [6] purports to exhaustively check hazard free operation
of a production rule set. prlint is no longer easily available, and we were unable
to acquire a version capable of running on a modern Linux workstation.
A class of Petri nets, called signal transition graphs (STGs), can be used
to model certain aspects of asynchronous circuits [13], and a number of works,
e.g., [24, 4, 27, 30, 31] propose methods of model checking these Petri net
specifications. Certain high-level properties such as liveness and fairness can be
verified in this way, but the STG specification does not expose low-level circuit
properties like the timing of forks.
9 Conclusion
This paper improves upon our earlier work in [12, 10], providing a cleaner formal
semantics of production rule sets for the delay-insensitive case, including both a
set-theoretic semantics and an executable semantics in rewriting logic; which
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first of its kind. The utility of our work
here is, first and foremost, toward promoting a common understanding of what
production rule sets mean, especially to those entering the field of asynchronous
circuit design; and, secondly for the purpose of formal analysis of such circuits.
Regarding formal analysis, the set-theoretic semantics is perhaps best suited
as the foundation for proving meta-theorems about production rule sets, as we
did in [12]. The executable rewriting logic semantics is instead better suited to
establishing the functional correctness of individual circuits, as certain obligations
may be discharged automatically, as we showed above and in [10].
A number of challenges remain, some rather daunting. Firstly, the speed-
independence and quasi delay-insensitivity cases from [12] should be further
developed along the lines of what we did here for the delay-insensitive case.
Second, there is the issue of scalability; we have been able to automatically
check hazard freedom and deadlock freedom for circuits up to about one hundred
production rules, but modern circuits can easily be four orders of magnitude
larger.
One possibility is to investigate probabilistic methods in more detail, which
are highly parallelizable and scale extremely well. Existing work on probabilistic
rewrite systems and statistical model checking [1, 2] allows for a rewriting-based
approach to continue to be used, and perhaps even build directly on our work
here.
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A Proof of Lemma 2, Theorem 1, and Corollary
1
Proof of Lemma 2.
By cases on a:
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• (skip): It is enough to show that both 〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip, with
respect to SPRS , and cast(〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(skip), with respect
to RPRS , hold unconditionally.
That 〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip holds unconditionally with respect to
SPRS is established according to the rule (where the variables used in the
rule are not the same as those above; they are implicitly quantified)
·
〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip
Similarly, with respect to RPRS ,
RPRS ` cast(〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉) =
<[cast(g)->cast(x)cast(d)],(cast(σ),cast(H))>
−→ skip = cast(skip)
due to the rewriting rule
rl < [G -> Y D], (Sigma,H) > => skip .
• (y := 1): (⇒) Suppose 〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ y := 1 holds with respect to
SPRS ; we show that also cast(〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(y := 1) with
respect to RPRS .
Clearly, 〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ y := 1 may only hold with respect to SPRS
according to the rule
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
which implies that σ(g) = 1, and also that d =↑ and y = x. Therefore,
cast(〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉)
= <[cast(g)->cast(x)+],(cast(σ),cast(H))>
and matches the left-hand side of the rewrite rule
crl < [G -> Y +], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 1)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
That σ(g) = 1 implies also the condition of the rewriting rule:
cast(σ)(cast(g)) == 1
is straightforward. This yields, as needed, that
cast(〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(x) := 1 = cast(y := 1).
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(⇐) Suppose RPRS ` cast(〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(y := 1).
cast(y := 1) = cast(y) := 1, and it is clear that the only way this
rewriting can occur is by application of the rule
crl < [G -> Y +], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 1)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
Through pattern matching, we get again that cast(y) = cast(x) and
therefore that y = x; cast(d) = +, which implies that d =↑; and that
cast(σ)(cast(g)) == 1. Then, assuming that cast(σ)(cast(g)) == 1
one can straightforwardly derive that σ(g) = 1.
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
applies to 〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 = 〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 which ultimately yields
the desired result that 〈g 7→ x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ (x := 1) = (y := 1).
• The remaining cases are similar.
Proof of Theorem 1.
(TR simulates TM): Let (σ,H), (σ′, H ′) ∈ StateP be such that
(σ,H) −→M (σ′, H ′)
According to Definition 2, there exist actions a1, . . . , am such that: (a) for each
aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 〈rj , (σ,H)〉 −→ aj , and (b)
(σ′, H ′) = (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that
castP ((σ,H)) −→R castP ((σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am]))
In order to show that the above relation holds, we will apply the top-level
rewrite rule defined in RPRS , namely
crl (Sigma,H) {P} => (Sigma[A],H[Sigma,A] {P}) {P}
if mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A .
and Lemma 2. Expanding castP ((σ,H)) shows that it matches the left-hand
side of this rule:
castP ((σ,H)) = (cast(σ),cast(H)){cast(P )}
41
For the condition, we first expand mkActs according to its definition, yielding
mkActs(cast(r1) . . . cast(rm),(cast(σ),cast(H))) =
<cast(r1),(cast(σ),cast(H))>, . . . ,<cast(rm),(cast(σ),cast(H))>
and which, according to Lemma 2, rewrites to
cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)
Therefore, by the above rewrite rule, which is part of RPRS , we obtain that
castP ((σ,H)) rewrites to a term (Sigma’,H’){P} with
Sigma’ = cast(σ)[cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)]
and
H’ = cast(H)[cast(σ),cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)]{cast(P )}
Expanding castP ((σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])), one obtains a term
(cast(σ[a1, . . . , am]),cast(H[σ, a1, . . . , am])){cast(P )}
and so it remains to be proved that H’ = cast(H[σ, a1, . . . , am]), which is
straightforward.
(TM simulates TR): Let (σ,H) ∈ StateP and let c′ be a term of sort
Configuration such that
castP ((σ,H)) −→R c′
As there is only a single rewrite rule in RPRS that operates on terms of the same
kind as the sort Configuration, namely
crl (Sigma,H) {P} => (Sigma[A],H[Sigma,A] {P}) {P}
if mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A .
c′ must be of the form
(cast(σ)[A],cast(H)[cast(σ),A]{cast(P )}){cast(P )}
for some term A of sort 2^Action reachable via rewriting from the term
mkActs(cast(P ),(cast(σ),cast(H)))
Lemmas 2 and 1 about the injectivity of cast imply that, letting P = {r1, . . . , rm},
A is of the form
cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)
with a1, . . . , am ∈ ActionP , such that for each aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, cast(aj) is had
through rewriting a term of the form <cast(rj),(cast(σ),cast(H))>. This es-
tablishes, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m, thatRPRS ` <cast(rj),(cast(σ),cast(H))> −→
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cast(aj), and therefore by Lemma 2 also that 〈rj , (σ,H)〉 −→ aj . Then applying
the rule 〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
we get that (σ,H) −→M (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am]). Again, it remains to
be shown that the _[_] operators, for each component of the state, correspond,
which follows according to a straightforward induction.
Proof of Corollary 1.
(⇒): Suppose that ReachTM(s0) ⊆ QM; we demonstrate by induction on TR
reachability derivations (these transition systems have finite carriers) that also
ReachTR(castP (s0)) ⊆ QR.
The induction hypothesis asserts that, for a reachable configuration
c ∈ ReachTR(castP (s0))
both of the following conditions hold: (1) c ∈ castP (StateP ), and for the
unique s ∈ StateP , guaranteed by Lemma 1, such that castP (s) = c, (2)
s ∈ ReachTM(s0). This implies that s ∈ QM and therefore that c ∈ QR.
The induction hypothesis clearly holds for c0 = castP (s0). Now, let
castP (s) = c ∈ Configuration
be such that it has both properties of the induction hypothesis and suppose
that c −→R c′ with c′ ∈ Configuration. It follows from Theorem 1 and the
induction hypothesis that there exists a s′ ∈ StateP such that s −→M s′ and
castP (s
′) = c′. This implies that c ∈ castP (StateP ) and that s′ ∈ ReachTM(s0).
(⇐): This direction follows similarly, but without the need of Lemma 1.
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Circuit Name Size delay-insensitive speed-independence
3InverterRing 12rl
no
– states – 2ms
– 10, 944 rewrites
yes
12 states – 9ms
– 55, 254 rewrites
ClosedBuffer 26rl
no
– states – 372ms
– 2, 054, 504
rewrites
yes
20 states – 93ms
– 513, 522
rewrites
Toggle 28rl
no
– states – 118ms
– 766, 143
rewrites
yes
28 states – 63ms
– 392, 887
rewrites
PCHBAndFixed 66rl
no
– states –
74, 692ms
– 415, 399, 458
rewrites
yes
681 states –
9, 647ms
– 55, 564, 688
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl – –
PCHBAndToggle 130rl – –
Circuit Name Size quasi-delay-insensitive
3InverterRing 12rl
yes
17 states – 18ms
– 100, 313
rewrites
ClosedBuffer 26rl
yes
59 states –
551ms
– 2, 561, 312
rewrites
Toggle 28rl
yes
139 states –
502ms
– 2, 648, 172
rewrites
PCHBAndFixed 66rl
yes
2, 679 states –
83, 471ms
– 409, 224, 700
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl –
PCHBAndToggle 130rl –
Figure 5: Hazard freedom model checking results for all three timing assumptions.
System configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB
RAM, 64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “–” indicates that the experiment
timed out or exhausted available memory resources.
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Circuit Name Size delay-insensitive speed-independence
3InverterRing 12rl
no
– states –
1, 497ms
– 9, 051, 904
rewrites
yes
12 states – 9ms
– 55, 242 rewrites
ClosedBuffer 26rl –
yes
20 states – 97ms
– 513, 502
rewrites
Toggle 28rl –
yes
28 states – 63ms
– 392, 859
rewrites
PCHBAndFixed 66rl –
no
– states –
10, 395ms
– 55, 523, 752
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl – –
PCHBAndToggle 130rl – –
Circuit Name Size quasi-delay-insensitive
3InverterRing 12rl
yes
17 states – 17ms
– 100, 296
rewrites
ClosedBuffer 26rl
yes
59 states –
555ms
– 2, 561, 253
rewrites
Toggle 28rl
yes
139 states –
501ms
– 2, 648, 033
rewrites
PCHBAndFixed 66rl
no
– states –
87, 629ms
– 408, 664, 483
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl –
PCHBAndToggle 130rl –
Figure 6: Deadlock freedom model checking results for all three timing assump-
tions. System configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB
L3), 24GiB RAM, 64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “–” indicates that the
experiment timed out or exhausted available memory resources.
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Circuit Name Size speed-independence
3InverterRing 12rl
yes
6 states – 1ms
– 9, 514 rewrites
ClosedBuffer 26rl
yes
10 states – 5ms
– 37, 596 rewrites
Toggle 28rl
yes
12 states – 5ms
– 42, 546 rewrites
PCHBAndFixed 66rl
yes
114 states –
668ms
– 4, 270, 606
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl
yes
1, 800 states –
117, 925ms
– 453, 471, 253
rewrites
PCHBAndToggle 130rl
yes
2, 844 states –
76, 436ms
– 298, 696, 957
rewrites
Figure 7: Hazard freedom model checking results, wires removed. System
configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB RAM,
64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18.
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